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Article

The Political Economy of the Intellectual Property RegimeBuilding in China: Evidence From the Evolution of the
Chinese Patent Regime
Kong Qingjiang*
As a result of the globalization of China's economy, particularly its accession
to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Chinese intellectual property rights
(IPR) regime has undergone a remarkable transformation. In theory, the IPR laws
provide for strong protection of IPRs. However, as experts have focused on the
enforcement of China's IPR laws, international IPR holders have noticed that
Chinese IPR rules are often ignored in practice, and the political economy of IPR
in China has largely been ignored.
This paper argues that through evidence found in Chinese patent laws,
industrial policy aimed at the promotion of economic development is driving the
evolution of China's IPR regime. It further examines the emergence of a
comprehensive Chinese IPR strategy, also stemming from the same driving
forces. It is further noted that while such forces might have a bearing on the IPR
regime, it is China's political economy that will predominantly drive its IPR
regime forward in the direction now championed by the West.
I. INTRODUCTION

A.

What is Behind an IPR Regime?

Historically, an IPR regime is often used as an instrument of industrial policy
for countries in late-developer status. For example, Japan's patent system was
used to import foreign technology and distribute it among domestic firms for
quite a long time.' In the context of governmental attitudes towards the role of
foreign technology in national development, one of the explicit goals of a patent
regime is to achieve independence and autonomy through indigenization of
technology, and to diffuse and promote this knowledge throughout the economy.
A number of economists, legal scholars and officials advocate the use of
industrial policy initiatives to institute and carry out an IPR regime. They argue
that it is crucial to maintain a socially desirable patent system.2

* Professor of Law, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou, China. The author sincerely thanks
Tracy Owens' for her most helpful work in refining the paper.
1. See Someno Yoshinobu, General History of Japanese Patent System, 27 PATENT STUDIES 11, 21
(1999).
2. For example, Robert J. Girouard noted that even the U.S. government to some degree views the patent
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To be fair, it is the industrial policy strategy that is behind an IPR regime. In
the opinions of those who advocate the industrial policy approach, any real-world
IPR regime must be amenable to interference-regardless of whether it is carried
out by the political whims of the administrative agency or by judicial discretion
to reluctantly accord stronger protection-in the service of promoting economic
development and national interests. If the IPR regime results in considerable
problems for foreign IPR holders seeking patents in the country in question, the
industrial policy strategy would be blamed.

II. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CHINESE
IPR REGIME-BUILDING
China has pursued a strategy of economic modernization since the late
1970s. The strategy has been naturally made based on technological upgrading as
well as openness to foreign investment and further integration into the global
economy. In this context, one of China's top policy priorities at the outset of its
modernization drive was to formulate its own IPR regime.3 As a result, the
Trademark Law and the Patent Law were enacted in 1982 and 1984 respectively.
A noteworthy feature of the IPR regime-building process in China has been
its gradualism, which means that the scope of the protection for IPR and the
standards for such protection are made to correspond to the level of economic
development and are responsive to the needs of economic development in the
country. This gradualism accounted for the delayed enactment of the Copyright
Law until 1990,' as well as the relatively narrow scope and low standard of the
protection that was provided in China's IPR regime before 1992.6 Interestingly,
this gradualist approach also made the development of the IPR regime adaptive

system as an instrument of "industrial policy." See Girouard, U.S. Trade Policy and the Japanese Patent
System, (Hass School of Business, BRIE Working Paper 89, August 1996).
3. On May 12, 1977, just before Deng Xiaoping (who launched a modernization drive in China)
reemerged among the top Chinese leadership, directed that a patent system be put into place during a meeting
with Fang Yi and Li Chang, who were in charge of administering technology and education ministries. The
highlights of Deng's speech transcripts are available at http://www.cas.cn/html/cas50/bns/1977.html.
4. Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted March 12, 1984 (translated in WTO
Document IP/N//CHN/I/l) [Hereinafter "Patent Law"].
5. Copyright Law of The People's Republic of China, adopted Sept. 7, 1990 at the Fifteenth Session of
the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People's Congress (translated by Consulate General of the
People's Republic of China in San Francisco, available at http://www.chinaconsulatesf.org/eng/kj/wjfg/
t43948.htm).
6. In 1992, China and the U.S. signed the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of
the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America on the Protection of
Intellectual Property, under which China pledged to extend copyright protection to foreign owners of software,
books, firms, sound recordings, and other mediums previously unprotected.
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to the conditions of scientific and technological development of the society. The
changes introduced into the IPR regime to deal with the digital environment
served as an illustrative example.'
Another noteworthy feature of the IPR regime-building process in China is
that it has been intertwined with its foreign trade relations, or more precisely,
much of the process has been propelled by international pressure, particularly
from the U.S., who has consistently pressured China to expand the scope of, and
raise the standard for, IPR protection.8 During the prolonged negotiations before
China's accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and
later to the World Trade Organization (WTO), much pressure was exerted upon
China in this regard.9
It is not difficult to see that by 1992, increased foreign pressure circumvented
the gradualist approach that China had been accustomed to in its IPR regime
building. The reform of its IPR regime suddenly became a major and urgent
policy issue under such pressure. As a result, there were far more moves between
1992 and 2001-some of them very radical-than had been seen during the
previous decade. In the Sino-U.S. Agreement on China's accession to the WTO
in 1999, China committed itself to bring its IPR regime into full compliance with
the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS
Agreement)' ° and reiterated this position later in the Protocol on the Accession of
China to the WTO (Accession Protocol)." China agreed to expand its IPR regime
to cover all main areas of IPR so that protection of geographical indications and
layout designs of integrated circuits would be available;' 2 to raise the substantive

7.

For a survey of how the Chinese copyright regime responded to the needs arising from technological

development, see Qingjiang Kong, Old Bottlefor New Wine, PRC Copyright Legislation in the DigitalContext,

ISSUES & STUDIES Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 158-175.
8. See ANDREW MERTHA, POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA
(Singapore University Press 2006).
9. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WORKING PARTY REPORT: ACCESSION OF CHINA, WT/ACC/
CHN/49/Add.2 at 35 (Oct. 1, 2001); see also Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO News Press

Release/243 (Sept. 17, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news e/pres01Ie/pr243-e.htm (describing China's commitment to undertake a series of important commitments to open and liberalize its regime in
order to better integrate in the world economy and offer a more predictable environment for trade and foreign
investment in accordance with WTO rules).
10.
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
AGREEMENT, art. 28, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
IC, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320
(1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreements].
II. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, PROTOCOL ON THE ACCESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, Nov. 10, 2001, available at http://unpanl.un.orglintradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN
002123.pdf [hereinafter "WTO ACCESSION PROTOCOL"].
12. Although the relevant rules of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce and the State
General Administration of the People's Republic of China for Quality Supervision and Inspection and
Quarantine partly provided protection for geographical indications (including appellations of origin) the preamendment Trademark Law did not have a specific provision on the protection of geographical indications.
Similarly, although China was one of the first countries to sign the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of

Integrated Circuits in 1989, it did not promulgate the specific Regulations on the Protection of Layout Designs
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standards of protection, including procedures for the acquisition and maintenance
of IPR; to take further measures to control abuse of IPR; and to fortify
enforcement.
For example, in relation to IPR enforcement, China committed itself to
amending civil judicial procedures and remedies, making available provisional
measures,13 strengthening administrative sanctions against IPR infringement,
improving special border measures for IPR protection, and lowering the
threshold for initiating criminal procedures to ensure full compliance with the
TRIPS Agreement.14 Moreover, China committed itself to implementing the
TRIPS Agreement immediately upon accession-with no transition period.
Consequently, upon its accession to the WTO, China had already put into place
an IPR regime that was relatively consistent with the international standard for
IPR protection as dictated by the TRIPS Agreement.
However, the WTO-compatible IPR regime has not been able to completely
dispel the anxiety of IPR holders, Chinese or foreign, for widespread piracy and
counterfeiting. The reason for this continued anxiety seems to be lack of
enforcement.
Paradoxically, the new IPR regime which stipulates a higher standard for
protection has since triggered a lively debate among Chinese businesses, officials
and intellectuals. It is argued that such an IPR regime, with its efficient and
transparent regulatory framework, should be able to facilitate the process of
technology diffusion associated with knowledge transactions between Chinese
and foreign firms, as well as foster the innovative capacity of China in its
transition to a knowledge-based economy. However, given the fact that most
IPR's are held by foreign investors, particularly multinational corporations, the
Chinese IPR regime is actually giving foreign IPR holders a competitive edge by
providing a high standard of protection for foreign IPR. This has given rise to the
concern that Chinese enterprises will be disadvantaged in IPR-based competition
with multinational companies.
Thus, as a countermeasure, China has begun to implement a separate national
IPR strategy to improve its competitiveness. Although details of the new IPR
strategy have not been made public, its implementation and impact on the further
development of China's IPR regime and foreign IPR holders are worth careful
attention and study.
To be sure, every nation's experience with its IPR regime is shaped by
complex (and probably unique) historical, political, and cultural forces, but there
may be some general principles at work across various specific cases. To
understand the political economy of the Chinese IPR regime, a case study of the

of Integrated Circuits until April 2001, which then became effective Oct. 1, 2001.
13. Although there were provisions on property preservation in China's patent law, no explicit
stipulations had been provided to authorize the people's court to take measures to prevent infringements prior to
formal institution of a lawsuit.
14. See WTO ACCESSION PROTOCOL, supra note 11.

Global Business & Development Law Journal/ Vol. 21
Chinese patent law is given below. A look at the history of Chinese patent law
legislation from the Patent Law of 1984, to the amendment of 2000 in accordance
with the TRIPS Agreement will meaningfully illustrate how economic
development policy, international trade relations and IPR have been intertwined
with one another. Having done this, we will also be in a better position to look
ahead to the future. After all, tomorrow's IPR regime may be no more than a
logical extension of the political economy of today's IPR regime.
III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: FROM 1984 TO 2000
Although the current patent regime is at the core of the present discussion, it
is helpful to look at the twisted path that China has taken in instituting a patent
law system in its modern history. The patent regime in China dated back to
the late Qing Dynasty, when the Imperial Court was forced or induced to
sign the treaties on navigation and commerce with the Powers.' 5 Some of
these treaties provided for a reciprocal patent-granting arrangement
whereby citizens of one contracting party could apply for and secure patent
rights for their inventions in the other contracting party. Since the number
of inventions by Chinese citizens was much smaller, the reciprocal
treatment that was built into the treaties really only granted privileges to
foreigners, and were often criticized as being unfair to China.
Besides foreign pressure, domestic aspirations for a modernized nation
also partly accounted for the emergence of the nascent patent regime. Then,
in the second part of the 19th century, the Imperial Court of the Qing
Dynasty was pressured to reform itself for its own survival. It was in the
course of struggle for survival that the very first piece of patent law in
Chinese history, entitled "Charter of Rewards on Invigoration of Industry
and Art", came to be passed on July 12, 1889.16
Not long after the passing of the patent law, the Qing Dynasty was
overthrown in 1911. The succeeding Republican Government replaced the
short-lived Charter of Rewards with the Interim Charter on Rewarding
Industrial and Artistic Products. Thereafter, the Nationalist Government
put into effect a series of other provisions governing patents, and in 1944 it
promulgated a "modern" Patent Law. Unfortunately, the new Patent Law
soon ceased to be effective on mainland China (i.e. the People's Republic
of China) due to the fact that the Communist Party of China (CPC)
15. For instance, on August 18, 1903, China and the United States concluded a treaty on
navigation and commerce.
16. Charter of Rewards on Invigoration of Industry and Art, promulgated by Qing Dynasty on
July 12, 1889.
17. The CPC nullified all the laws and regulations that were applicable in China under the Nationalist
Government.
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defeated the Nationalist Government.
Soon after the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, the Central
People's Government adopted the Provisional Regulations on the
Protection of the Invention Rights and Patent Rights."5 The purpose of those
provisions was to encourage invention. But the new government was
preoccupied with other urgent matters, and from its promulgation until its
abolishment in 1963, only six invention certificates and four patent certificates in total were issued. '9 During the Cultural Revolution, the country
was obsessed with political struggles and the elimination of private
ownership, and the newly created primitive patent system was on the verge
of being abolished. Only after the government decided to embark on the
course of economic modernization in late 1970s, was the re-establishment
20
of a patent system again put on the agenda of the post-Mao government.
However, the priority was not to protect the rights of inventors but to
promote inventions. It was in this spirit that in 1978 the Regulations on
Awards for Inventions were adopted. 2'
Interestingly, when China began to negotiate the Agreement on Trade
Relations with the United States, it realized the need to put into place a
patent system and took a series of steps.22 In March of 1980, China entered
into the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). 23 In December 1984,
24
it acceded to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. The
Patent Law was promulgated on March 12, 1984 and took effect on April 1,
1985. It underwent a substantial revision in 1992 and was further amended
in 2000 to keep it in line with international practice.25 The Patent Law

18. Provisional Regulations on the Protection of the Invention Rights and Patent Rights,
promulgated by the Central People's Government on August 1, 1950. (available in Collections of the
Regulations by the Central People's Government (1949-1950) Zhongyang Renmin Zhengfu Faling
Huibian, Law Press, 1982.)
19. See a survey entitled "Provisional Regulations on the Protection of the Invention Rights and
Patent Rights". availableat http://www.ndcnc.gov.cnldatalib/2003/Newltem/DLDL-183561
20. See Patent Law, supra note 4.
21. Intellectual Property Office, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic of China, Regulations on
Awards for Inventions, availableat http://www.tipo.gov.tw/eng/laws/patlaw-4.asp [Hereinafter "Regulations on
Awards for Inventions"].
22. United States of America and China Agreement on Trade Relations, signed at Beijing July 17, 1979.
Among other things, the U.S. insisted during negotiations that each party agree to protect IPR of citizens of the
other party.
23. See VAI Lo & XIAOWEN TIAN, LAW AND INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE LEGAL AND BUSINESS
ENVIRONMENTS (Routledge 2005). The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is one of the

specialized agencies of the United Nations. WIPO was formally created by the Convention Establishing the
World Intellectual Property Organization (Signed at Stockholm on July 14, 1967 and as amended on September
28, 1979). Under Article 3 of this Convention, WIPO seeks to "promote the protection of intellectual property
throughout the world."
24. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Paris Notification No. 114: Accession by
the People's Republic of China (Dec. 19, 1984), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/notdocs/en/paris
treatyparis_ 14.html.
25. Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted March 12, 1984 (translated in WTO
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stipulates the procedures and standards for granting patent rights for
inventions, utility models and designs.
In the process of building a patent regime, three major events should be
mentioned: First, in 1984, China became a party to the Paris Convention on
the Protection of Industrial Property; second, in 1992 China reached an
agreement with the U.S. in the form of the Memorandum of Understanding
between China and the U.S. on the protection of IPR; and third, in 2001
China entered the WTO by committing itself, among other things, to
enforcing the TRIPS Agreement.26 Thus, seen from a historical perspective,
it took almost 100 years for China to establish a patent system consonant
with the prevailing standards of the international community.
IV. INTERACTION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL TRADE RELATIONS
AND THE CHINESE PATENT LAW

A central feature of the 1984 Chinese Patent Law was the narrowness of its
scope of protection. It failed to provide protection for inventions of
pharmaceutics, chemicals, food, beverages and condiments, among other
things. 27 It was not until the conclusion of the Memorandum of Understanding
between China and the U.S. (and its requirement that all signatory nations
provide the same treatment to foreigners as it provides to its own nationals)nearly a century after the passage of the first patent provision-that China finally
pledged itself to expand the scope of protection. The enlargement of the scope of
protection was formally incorporated into the Chinese patent law with the
amendment of the Patent Law in 1992.25
De facto discrimination against foreign inventors is another feature of the
1984 Patent Law. 29 For example, whether a foreign inventor was entitled to the
protection provided by the Patent Law was dependent upon reciprocity or
authorization by an agreement between China and the inventor's own country.

Document IP/N/l/CHNJ/1I); amended in accordance with the Decision of the Standing Committee of the
Seventh National People's Congress on Amending the Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, at its 27th
Meeting on September 4, 1992; amended again in accordance with the Decision of the Standing Committee of
the Ninth National People's Congress on Amending the Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted
at its 17th Meeting on August 25, 2000.
26. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WORKING PARTY REPORT: ACCESSION OF CHINA, WT/ACC/CHN/
49/Add.2 at 54 (Oct. 1, 2001)
27. According to Article 25 of the 1984 Patent Law, the following subject matters are not
covered by patent protection: scientific discoveries; rules and methods for mental activities; methods
for diagnosis or treatment of diseases; animal and plant varieties; substances obtained by means of
nuclear transformation.
28. Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted March 12, 1984 (translated in WTO
Document IP/N/l/CHN/I/I); amended in accordance with the Decision of the Standing Committee of the
Seventh National People's Congress on Amending the Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, at its 27th
Meeting on September 4, 1992.
29. id.
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Another example in this regard is the stipulated procedure of application for a
patent by foreign inventors.
However, for the sake of attracting foreign investors, China nevertheless
accorded equal treatment to foreign inventors under the Patent Law (under the
condition that the inventor's country of citizenship accord reciprocal protection
to inventions by Chinese inventors).' Even then, it must be admitted that
recognition of foreigners' rights was extended rather grudgingly, and in such a
manner that effective protection of foreign inventions was largely denied within
the Chinese borders. A useful illustration of this general phenomenon is the
problem of forced technology transfers, whereby foreign investors were coerced
into transferring technology as a condition of the approval of a joint venture.
Technology transfer relating to investing activities by foreigners was once
mandatory in laws, regulations and in industrial policies,32 which inevitably
encroached upon the interests of foreign investors and was an object of much
resentment among them. This practice was not put to an end until the laws and
regulations concerning foreign investment and industrial policies were revised
between 2000 and 2001.
It is rather easy to understand the rationale for China's early policy as
indicated in the 1984 Patent Law; China was primarily an importer of
technologies, and simple economics dictated that it leave foreign technology
unprotected. For example, a survey found that 97.4 percent of the new drugs
produced by Chinese pharmaceutical companies produce are modeled after
foreign products, while only 2.6 percent are their own inventions.33 The de facto
discrimination against foreign inventions can be explained as an attempt to build
up a domestic invention-based industry by allowing it to "free ride" on inventive
efforts of foreigners, and it can be argued that China's patent policy was part of a
larger strategy to promote the development of domestic infant industries.
Providing patent protection only for inventions, which Chinese enterprises are
technologically capable of making, worked to the advantage of the growing
Chinese economy. Because of this provision, Chinese enterprises could use
foreign inventions at relatively low cost (since they were not obligated to pay
royalties to the foreign inventors). Of course, this kind of practice is not

30. Article 18 of the Patent Law provided that [11f a foreigner, foreign enterprise or other foreign
organization having no regular residence or place of business in China files an application for a patent in China,
the application shall be handled under this Law in accordance with any agreement concluded between the
country to which the applicant belongs and China, or any international treaty to which both countries are party,
or on the basis of the principle of reciprocity.
31. Patent Law, art. 18.
32. See, e.g., Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures;
Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures, translated at http://english.sohu.com/2004/07/04/78/article2208
47835.shtml.
33. China News Daily, Experts Call for Protection of Traditional Chinese Medicine, http://english.
peopledaily.com.cn/200111/26/eng20011126_85340.shtml (last updated Nov. 26, 2001), referring to original
survey results published in Chinese language, available at http://www.medboo.combusiness/message/
1017171613.htm.
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particularly unique to China. In fact, the early history of international patents in
the West told the same story: discrimination against foreigners was the rule
34 in
international patent relations until the middle part of the nineteenth century.
The Chinese experience during the crucial 20 years between the
promulgation of the Patent Law in 1984, and the revision of the Patent Law in
accordance with the TRIPS Agreement in 2000, is instructive. During its first
eight years, the protectionist provision of the 1984 Patent Law served quite well
to promote domestic research and development. At least partly thanks to the
imitation and indigestion of foreign patented technology, which was made
possible by the relatively low standard and narrow scope of protection, Chinese
research and development saw much growth in this period.
What then, accounted for the shift away from patent protectionism? This is
an enormously complex question, and no single factor can possibly offer an
explanation for this dramatic worldwide trend. But one thing is clear: if China
had continued to balk on liberalizing and reforming its patent policies, foreign
investors would have eventually become disenchanted with the Chinese market
and China would have sustained significant losses in the amounts of foreign
capital and technology, upon which the country's economic modernization was
so dependent. A substantial decline in foreign investment would have also
dimmed the prospects for increased efficiency, innovation, and competitiveness
for domestic Chinese enterprises. Thus, there was a strong motivation among
Chinese leaders and officials to continue the gradual enlargement of protection
for patented inventions of foreigners, which ultimately eliminated the practice of
forced technology transfers.
But this was not the full story; there were more subtle and complex forces at
work as well. Recognition of foreign patent rights is not simply a response to
increased exports of patented products or the transfer of patented technology; it is
also connected with a country's importer-exporter status change. While giving
recognition to foreign patents is disadvantageous to countries that are importers
of patented products, it is advantageous to those that are primarily exporters of
such products. As China climbed the developmental ladder, it changed from
being a simple importer to both importer and exporter of intellectual creations,
and simultaneously changed from a host country of foreign investment to both a
host and source of foreign investment. As China underwent this status change,
the cost-benefit ratio in recognizing foreign IPR shifted. China was satisfied, in
effect, to offer the following deal to others: we will provide patent protection for
the products of your inventors if you provide reciprocal protection for our
inventors under your patent law. This was due to the realization that China had
more and more to gain from the protection of their inventors outside its borders,
in comparison to what they stood to lose by offering protection to foreigners.

34.

COMMISSION FOR INTELLETUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (CIPR), Integrating Intellectual Property Rights

and Development Policy, available at http://www.iprcommission.org/.
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In fact, the history of international patent relations bore out this simple
opposition between exporters, or foreign investors (favoring reciprocal
recognition of foreign inventions) and importers, or Chinese partners (resisting
such recognition). Western experience in this regard offered a good example. The
first country to agitate for the principles of "international protection of IPR" was
the U.S., one of the major exporters of IPR products and investors in patented
technology. The U.S. tolerated rampant patent infringement and hence exerted
intense diplomatic pressure on China as the latter denied patent protection to U.S.
inventions. As a matter of fact, the amendment to the 1984 Patent Law in
1992, which enlarged the scope of patent protection to cover pharmaceutics, chemicals, food, beverages and condiments, and also extended the
protection terms, was also dictated by the Memorandum of Understanding
between China and the United States on the protection of IPR.35
V. THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN THE
SHAPING OF THE PATENT REGIME

While emphasizing the interaction between international trade relations
and the Chinese Patent Law, we should not lose sight of the role of
economic development policy in shaping the patent regime. In fact,
concerns for economic development have given a distinctive character to
China's Patent Law. Status change of state-owned enterprises in the patent
regime was an obvious example in this regard. From 1984 until 1992, although
economic reform was launched and continued, China's economy was still
dominated by the state sector.3 6 The government tried to maintain this dominance,
allowing non-state-owned enterprises to play a mere complimentary role in the
economy, and the state-owned enterprises were still more or less controlled by
the government. Correspondingly, the 1984 Patent Law contained some special
arrangements for state-owned enterprises: first, a state-owned enterprise could
not own, but rather could "hold" a patent right; second, a state-owned enterprise
holding a patent right could not transfer the patent without permission from
relevant administrative governmental authority. 37 In other words, state-owned
enterprises were actually disadvantaged in the 1984 Patent Law despite the fact
that they were given a wide range of privileges vis-A-vis non-state-owned

35.

The Memorandum of Understanding is available at http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078-158780/

4/4/12279.pdf

36. For an analysis of the process of economic transformation in China in 1980s and 1990s, see
generally, Qingjiang Kong, Privatizationkvith Chinese Characteristics:Quest for ConstitutionalJustification,
Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 12, no. 36, at 537-551.
37. Prior to the 2000 amendment, Article 20 of the Patent Law provided that [11f a Chinese entity or
individual intends to file an application in a foreign country for a patent on an invention or creation completed
in China, it or he shall first file an application for patent with the Patent Office and shall, with the consent of the
relevant competent department under the State Council, entrust a patent agency designated by the State Council
to act on its or his behalf.
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enterprises in many other areas. However, beginning in 1992, the government
introduced a set of new policies virtually liberalizing the non-state sector in the
economic development. Economic changes brought about by this new policy
were a contributory factor to the amendment to the Patent Law in 2000, which
removed the restrictive provisions for state-owned enterprises and accorded equal
treatment to both state-owned and non-state owned enterprises or institutions in
obtaining patent ownership rights. This will help to promote fair competition
among state-owned and non-state enterprises, and encourage them to undertake
technological inventions.
The role of economic development policies in the formation of the
Chinese patent regime is most evident in the Patent Law's provision on
practical applicability.3 8 The Patent Law requires that an invention or utility
model can be made or used in some industries or under circumstances that
effective results can be produced. This requirement indicates that the goal of the
Patent Law is to encourage inventive activities for developing the national
economy. It should be noted, however, that the term "practical applicability" has
a broader meaning than the term "industrial applicability" adopted in other
countries. The selection of this term enables more inventions and utility models
to qualify for a patent.
The interaction between the level of economic development and standard for
patent protection is also indicative of the role of economic development policies in
the formation of the Chinese patent regime. It is known that prior to the 1992
amendment to the 1984 Patent Law, food, beverages and flavorings, pharmaceutical
products and substances obtained by means of a chemical process were not
patentable.4° The 1984 Patent Law also treated animal and plant varieties as nonpatentable. Article 25 of the current Patent Law, however, provides that the processes
used in producing animal and plant varieties may be granted patent rights, subject to
the other provisions of the Patent Law.4 ' The deletion of these items from the nonpatentable list represents a major step forward in China's patent regime, and put
China's Patent Law in line with the international standards. In fact, even microbes
are made patentable under the relevant provisions of the Regulations for the
Implementation of the Patent Law and the Guidelines for the Examination of Patent
Applications.42 On the other hand, the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) has

38. Patent Law, supra note 4, at art. 22.
39. As the INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (APPI)
observed in a document entitled "Resolution Q180", the term "practical applicability" is intended to include
inventions that are applicable to achieve a practical result, no matter whether they are to be used in commercial
spheres, while in most countries, the criterion of industrial applicability excludes from patentability inventions
which can be made and used only in the private or non commercial sphere. For more information, please see
http://www.aippi-china. org/main_ 09_q l80r.html
40. Patent Law, supra note 4, at art. 25.
41. Id.
42. Guidelines for Patent Applications (promulgated by the State Intellectual Property Office,
2006),§2.6.2.
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so far been reluctant to award patent rights to gene patent applications. One
explanation for this attitude towards gene patentability is that China fears that
multinational corporations and Western researchers might use gene or so-called
"patents on life" to seize control of potentially lucrative biological resources. Another
explanation however, points to the relatively low level of scientific research in this
area and economic development in general. Gene protection may be too "advanced"
an issue for contemporary China in its specific stage of scientific and economic
development.
The role of economic development policies in the formation of the Chinese
patent regime is also illustrated in the coexistence of the Patent Law and other
regulations encouraging inventions, which is also a distinctive feature of the Chinese
patent regime. It has been a long-standing national policy to promote scientific
research and invention. It was clearly stated in the 1984 Patent Law that the law was
designed to "promote the development of science and technology and meet the ends
of the socialist modernization". 3 The modern patent system in the Western sense is
exclusively based upon Patent Law," but the 1984 Patent Law • in41 China was
concurrently effective with the Regulations on Awards for Inventions, making the
Patent Law a less prominent legal issue. In fact, there has been no real change to this
policy since the inauguration of the patent regime. The framers of the 1984 Patent
Law attached as much, if not more, importance to the encouragement of inventions
as to the protection of rights of inventors. In the 1980's, there were more inventions
submitted for governmental awards in accordance with the Regulations on Awards
for Inventions" and the Regulations on Awards for Scientific and Technical
Improvements," than there were submitted for legal protection pursuant to the Patent
Law. It seems fair to argue that the promotional policy for scientific inventions adds
an important dimension to China's approach to patent regime building.

43.

Patent Law, supra note 4, at art. 1.

44.

In the 19th century, the patent system in Prussia was a combination of the patent law and a patent

awarding system. However, no such traits can be found in patent regimes of modem nation-states.
45. According to Huang Kunyi, then Director of the Patent Office, both the Patent Law and the
Regulations on Awards for Inventions are intended to encourage inventions. But the Patent Law applies in most
instances to conceptual methods for resolving technical problems that have not yet been put into practice. The
Regulations on Awards for Inventions applies to new scientific or technological achievements already utilized
and proven through actual application. Few patented inventions conform to the requirements of the Regulations
on Awards for Inventions, for it usually takes several (sometimes more than ten) years for patented inventions
to be put into application. Some inventions, though in conformity with the requirements of the Regulations on
Awards for Inventions, are not eligible for patent application. The Patent Law and the Regulations on Awards
for Inventions also contain significantly different considerations and approval procedures. It should be noted
that patents are generally granted to entities that produce economic benefits conducive to the development of
scientific research and the application of new technology to production. On the other hand, invention awards are
generally granted in circumstances where the inventor's workplace does not directly benefit from the

innovation.
46. See Regulations on Awards for Inventions, supra note 21. The Regulations were promulgated on
December 18, 1978 and revised on April 25, 1984 and June 28, 1993.
47. The Regulations on Awards for Scientific and Technical Improvements were promulgated by the
State Council on Sept. 12, 1984 and revised on June 28, 1993.
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Incidentally, the organizational changes in the governmental agency responsible
for patent administration are reflective of the change in the perceived importance of
the patent regime. The agency in charge of patent affairs had long been the Patent
Office, which was merely a subordinate office under the administration of the
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). This situation remained unchanged
until March 1988, when the Patent Office was transformed into the State Intellectual
Property Office (SIPO), which is a ministerial-level agency directly under the
administra-tion of the State Council. This should be interpreted as nothing less than a
governmental recognition of the increasingly important role that patents will play in
economic development, and a policy switch that was made to take full advantage of
IPR for the purpose of economic development.
VI. CONCLUSION

The exploration of the history of Chinese patent law, and in particular the history
of its international patent relationships, reveals that concerns for economic
development underlie the country's IPR laws: China's stage of economic
development dictates the pattern of IPR regime both in terms of scope and the level
of IPR protection.
It is obvious that China has simply taken up the old views once advocated and
now repudiated by the West, i.e., that the regime of IPR (particularly patents) is an
instrument for economic development. In contrast, the West developed new ideas
about IPR regimes, the authority of multilateral institutions and the rule of law, and
even human rights.
Of course, one would be foolish to project this simple model onto tomorrow's
complex world of international patent relations and IPR relations in general. But
there is something useful in the above-mentioned framework that may provide a
proper perspective with which to solve future IPR problems.
In the foreseeable future, as China remains far behind in terms of economic
development (as evidenced by science and technology), China will steadily induce a
return to moderate IPR protection. However, China is now driving to excel in science
and technology. Its strategic investment plan for science and technology lists dozens
of areas where it hopes, in time, to become the world's innovation leader. If it can
harness market forces to its objectives, it has a fair chance of achieving many of
them. In light of this, the Chinese IPR regime is bound to be ushered onto a genuine
fast track to the modernization of IPR protection.

